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DIANAWOODWARD 
ABSTRACT 
DISCIJSSES ADVANTAGES and disadvantages of two ethicalTHE 
theories-consequen tialism and deon tology-as bases for reasoning 
about ethical principles in general and intellectual freedom in 
particular. Concludes that a deontological defense of intellectual 
freedom is safer than a defense on consequentialist grounds. 
INTRODUCTION 
When one asks, “Why did person P do action A?” one may be 
asking a question about P or a question about A. If one interprets 
the question as asking what caused P to do A, then we are asking 
for information about person P such as was he abused as a child, stressed 
by his job, or suffering from a brain tumor. If one interprets the question 
as asking what reasons P had for doing A, then we are asking about 
the nature of the action A; on what basis might P (or anyone else) 
justify doing A? This article will be concerned with the latter problem: 
How can we provide reasons for or against a course of action? 
One hundred years ago this topic was better understood than 
i t  is today. Perhaps you have watched episodes of the T V  series Ethics 
in  America.’ What you saw was a discussion leader posing moral 
dilemmas to distinguished guests and then asking them how they 
felt about the problem or what they thought they would do. The 
guests would introspect to see how they felt or guess what they might 
do. This is not reasoning about ethics. Only a few of the guests 
were explicitly committed to sets of principles against which they 
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tested their options. Their reasoning from principles to choices was 
not the focus of the program and a more abstract reasoning about 
the principles themselves was not part of the show. To many of our 
contemporaries, ethics is no more than it is on that series-
introspecting how one feels about morally significant choices. 
It was different before our culture felt the influence of Freud 
in particular and the social sciences in general. It is these influences 
that prompt us to construe the question “Why did P do A?” as a 
question of causes (with which the social sciences deal) instead of 
a question about reasons. This perspective has become so common 
that people often forget that there is another issue to be considered. 
Never mind what caused P to do A ,  should she have done it? This 
question asks if there are reasons for P to do A (whether or not P 
is aware of those reasons). If there are justifying reasons, then those 
reasons apply to us as well. The results we obtain when looking 
for reasons tell us not only what P should have done but also what 
anyone relevantly similar to P should do. 
Unfortunately, the perspective of the social sciences has become 
so prevalent that it is common to find people who question whether 
or not it is even possible to reason about ethics. It will be demonstrated 
here that it is and, at the same time, introduce a method of ethical 
reasoning. Consider the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you. People who do not reflect much on these 
matters often cite this as an acceptable moral principle. It isn’t and 
I hope that I can lead you to uncover its flaws. The most obvious 
problem is that this should not be the guiding moral principle of 
a masochist who would hurt others because he wishes them to hurt 
him. What we have done is find a counterexample to the proposed 
moral principle. A counterexample is an example of the principle 
(the masochist who hurts others is treating them as he wishes to 
be treated) but counter to personal intuitions about ethics or to another 
the purported moral principle that one should not harm the innocent. 
Counterexamples to the Golden Rule are not limited to those 
involving people such as the masochist. Otherwise it could be said 
that for all who are not masochists the Golden Rule is an acceptable 
moral principle. Another counterexample to the Golden Rule is that, 
i f  obeyed as a moral principle, it would prohibit putting criminals 
in jail since we do not wish to be placed in jail. In this case we 
find a practice that ethical intuitions tell us is just (penalizing the 
guilty), and note that this runs counter to the principle in question- 
i.e., the Golden Rule. The method of counterexample will not prove 
that the purported ethical principle is a poor one. If one can produce 
a counterexample to a purported ethical principle, then either the 
principle is wrong or else the example counter to the principle is 
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wrong. (Perhaps the Golden Rule is an acceptable moral principle 
in which case i t  is okay for the masochist to harm people and it  
is wrong to penalize the guilty.) The method of counterexamples 
demonstrates a conflict to be resolved without itself determining 
which side of the conflict is right and which is wrong. Note also 
that the method of counterexamples cannot prove that an ethical 
principle is true. If we attempt to produce a counterexample to the 
principle and fail, perhaps that is because the principle is invulnerable 
to counterexample, but then again it may be that counterexamples 
exist and we have failed to find them. 
The point of this discussion about counterexamples to the Golden 
Rule is that we can reason about ethical principles. Moreover, the 
methods employed are similar to those of the research scientist who 
is reasoning about a purported scientific principle. If a counterex- 
ample can be found then there is so’mething wrong with the principle 
or with the counterexample. If no counterexample can be found, 
then the principle is still not provein (perhaps a counterexample exists 
but we did not discover it), but when a principle withstands serious 
attempts to develop counterexamples, it is said that the principle 
is confirmed. 
Many people base ethical judgments on principles that are 
prescribed by their religion or culture. However, accepting such 
principles as a starting point does not eliminate the need for ethical 
reasoning. One may accept the principle, “Thou shalt not kill” but 
have to decide whether letting someone die counts as an instance 
of killing. One may accept the principles “Thou shalt not kill” and 
“Thou shalt not lie” but have to resolve a conflict when the only 
way to prevent a killing is by telling a lie. Furthermore, the decision 
to accept principles prescribed by culture or religion involves ethical 
reasoning. The Ten Commandments are widely accepted (in part) 
because they seem ethically reasonable and not simply because they 
are religious teachings. The Ten Commandments would not have 
been so readily accepted if they had stated “Kill all siblings” or “Lie 
to all strangers.” 
To assess a purported ethical principle, one needs an ethical 
theory. There are two important types of theory and they often- 
but not always-yield the same results. The theories can be used 
to evaluate principles and to evaluate particular courses of action. 
The first to be discussed is based on consequences and the second 
is based on a system of rights, duties, and obligations. 
The theory based on consequences is of ten called consequen- 
tialism.2 There are several varieties depending on what consequence 
is deemed desirable and on what parties are being considered. If one 
seeks the best consequences for everyone except herself, she is an 
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altruist. If one seeks the best consequences for everyone including 
herself she is a utilitarian. If one seeks the best consequences for 
oneself only then she is an egoist. It is generally agreed that the 
consequences to be sought are some sort of long range well being 
(as opposed to short term pleasure). There is, however, considerable 
disagreement about what constitutes long-term well being. For 
instance, is a person better off contented or discontented, cared for 
by others or taking care of himself. 
It should be mentioned that some ethicists regard egoism as 
unacceptable as an ethical theory on the basis that it is merely a 
concern with one’s own well-being and not with that of others. 
However, the enlightened egoist will realize that to promote her own 
happiness, she must promote that of others as well. In defense of 
egoism one might note that i t  is the only ethical theory that can 
answer the question (which the Greeks considered important), “Why 
should I be moral?”3 The answer that egoism alone can give is that 
i t  is to your advantage to be moral. 
The great difficulty with consequentialist ethics is that it requires 
a large database of facts and huge amounts of processing time. How 
can one determine what is best even for oneself let alone what is 
best for everyone? The answer is that one never really can. 
Consequentialist ethics merely directs one to do one’s best at the 
relevant cost-benefit analyses. This can be particularly difficult if 
one must make a decision in a short time. 
A version of consequentialism has been developed to deal with 
this difficulty. Rule utilitarianism4 is a version of utilitarianism that 
directs us to use utilitarian principles to develop a set of rules. The 
rules can be developed at our leisure and then be quickly applied 
even in an emergency situation. It is granted that the rules may result 
in the wrong decision in a few cases. The suggestion is that they 
will serve us better than a hastily done consequentialist analysis of 
each individual ethical problem. 
There are two pitfalls to be avoided when consequentialism is 
used as a basis for decision making in professional ethics. The first 
pitfall is to analyze benefits without attention to costs. As a 
consequentialist deciding whom to promote to a higher position, 
one must consider not only what the benefits would be of having 
each different candidate in the higher position, but also the costs 
of losing that person at the lower position and the costs of not 
promoting other candidates. The second pitfall is to determine the 
ideal state of affairs without considering the problems of how to 
get from here to there. One’s consequentialist analysis might confirm 
that it would be best to have the proportion of librarians that are 
women and minorities equal to their proportion in the population. 
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One must then do a second analysis of each proposed method for 
achieving this goal. If there is no good way of achieving the goal, 
then one may have to sacrifice the goal. One cannot say the ends 
justify the means and thus endorse any means to a consequentially 
confirmed ideal goal. 
The other type of ethical theory-the one based on rights, duties, 
and obligations-is called deontology.5 It is as ancient as Homeric 
Greece where a person’s moral character was judged by how well 
that person carried out the duties of the person’s station in life. The 
duties of a nobleman, a wife, and a slave were all different. Socrates 
then wondered what duties might be expected of any citizen, and 
eventually the Lutherans and Calvinists speculated on what duties 
God might require of any person.6 It is, however, with the moral 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant7 that deontology is most closely 
associated today. 
Early in his reasoning, Kant concluded that the only thing good 
without exception was a good will. A person acting from good will 
was doing the right thing even if the consequences proved disastrous. 
Then Kant reasoned that a person is acting from good will if the 
person bases his action on what Kant called the “Categorical 
Imperative” (because it  was not a hypothetical command such as, 
“If you want A, do B,” but simply a command “Do B ” ) .  He had 
four ways of formulating the Categorical Imperative of which the 
best known is probably that you should act so that you could 
consistently will that everyone act the same. 
For example, I cannot consistently will that everyone always lie. 
To do so would merely change the meaning of negation. For instance, 
“I am happy,”’ would mean, “I am unhappy,” etc. Furthermore, I 
cannot even consistently will that people sometimes lie. If we could 
not assume that others were speaking the truth, no language 
community would evolve and thus lying (at least verbally) would 
be impossible. A child cannot learn the meaning of the word “red” 
if there is no reason to presume that a person saying “This is red” 
is telling the truth. Since we cannot consistently will that people 
always, or even sometimes, lie, we must adopt the maxim that one 
must never lie. 
Similar reasoning can lead one to establish a number of maxims 
to guide one’s ethical decision making. One problem that arises is 
how to phrase the maxim: I do not want to refrain from making 
love to my spouse on the grounds that I cannot consistently will 
that everyone do so. Instead of testing the maxim, “Make love to 
my spouse,” I want to test the maxim, “Make love to one’s own 
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spouse” or perhaps even “Make love to one’s own spouse if both 
parties are healthy, willing, and co-located.” It’s sort of difficult to 
know how to phrase the maxim. 
There are other forms of deontology besides that of Kant. for 
example, the American Constitution refers to the rights of mans that 
were developed by another line of reasoning. One begins with the 
question, “What is the nature of man?” If the answer is that man 
is essentially rational, then one draws conclusions about the ethical 
implications: that man has a right to that which he needs in order 
to exercise his rationality. Thus we have a right to life, a right to 
assemble and discuss, a right to read and publish. Also, the rights 
to assemble and discuss mean we have a right to liberty. 
One problem that arises with any claim concerning a person’s 
rights, is how to specify what is included. The best way to test a 
purported right is by considering the corresponding obligation. When 
we say, “Mary has a right to life,” do we mean merely that we are 
all obliged not to kill her or do we mean that we are all obliged 
to keep her alive? If her health care is expensive, then her right to 
life construed in the latter way conflicts with our rights to our own 
property. 
Resolution of conflicts is a problem for deontological theories. 
One may reason out what rights a person has or on what maxims 
one ought to act, but this is piecemeal support for each purported 
right and maxim. When two maxims come into conflict (one must 
lie to protect the innocent), then the deontologist has no further 
level of reasoning to which she can appeal to resolve the problem. 
Each maxim is categorical and must be obeyed under all  
circumstances. 
One hybrid ethical theory has arisen to deal with this problem. 
The concept of “prima facie” duties is that we can use deontological 
reasoning to determine what duties we all clearly have. However, 
in those cases where our duties come into conflict with each other, 
we may turn to consequentialist reasoning to resolve the conflict. 
One such conflict that occurs frequently in professional ethics 
for information managers is between one person’s right to information 
and another person’s right to privacy. The suggestion is that each 
right can be defended on principles deriving it from, for instance, 
the nature of man; but when the two rights come into conflict because 
A wants information about B that B wants kept private, then the 
issue is to be resolved by an appeal to consequences. This might 
be done on a case by case basis or by reasoning out a rule utilitarian 
solution that would apply to all cases of a given sort. 
There are both theoretical difficulties with deontological theories 
and pitfalls to be avoided in using these theories. One theoretical 
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difficulty lies with basing rights and obligations (what ought to be 
the case) on any version of the nature of man (what is the case). 
Some philosophers have argued that what is never entails what ough t  
t o  be. Others point out the difficulty of establishing any such thing 
as the nature of man. One of the two main pitfalls of using 
deontological ethical theories is, as mentioned earlier, the problem 
of phrasing the maxim to be tested by the Categorical Imperative. 
The other pitfall to be avoided is claiming that there is a right without 
making clear its limitations. This can best be done by specifying 
the corresponding obligations. If you have a right to information, 
what is my corresponding obligation: (1) not to take information 
from you, (2) to provide information to you for free, (3)  to provide 
information to you for an affordable price, (4) to educate you so 
that you can understand the information provided, (5) to provide 
a machine or person to read to you if you are blind? Am I obliged 
to do that? Establishing a deontological right to information is the 
beginning, not the end, of an ethical investigation concerning 
intellectual freedom. 
As a case study in reasoning about information ethics, consider 
how one might defend intellectual freedom. One can give both 
consequentialist and deontological arguments for intellectual 
freedom, but the choice of an ethical theory upon which intellectual 
freedom is based can result in different decisions about what ought 
to be done in particular cases. 
The term intellectual freedom, broadly construed, includes both 
the right to the intellectual efforts of others and a right to distribute 
one’s own intellectual efforts. These efforts include written works, 
conversation, speeches, and various art forms (e.g., dance or sculpture) 
that can be used to communicate ideas. 
To defend intellectual freedom on consequentialist grounds, one 
must make the case that i t  is best for someone (me, everyone except 
me, or all concerned) if information is broadly disseminated. The 
best known consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom comes 
from John Stuart Milllo who made his defense from the negative 
side-restricting intellectual freedom is harmful. He argued that if 
we suppress ideas we may be suppressing the truth. Even if the 
suppressed ideas are not the truth, there may be some germ of truth 
in  them or something that gives insights into new truths. 
Furthermore, even if the promoted opinion is the truth and suppressed 
views are completely false, people will not have as much faith and 
commitment to the promoted opinion if they do not see i t  openly 
debated and defended in con test with other views. For all these reasons, 
intellectual freedom is needed to make certain the truth is both 
discovered and believed. 
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The assumption behind this reasoning is that people are better 
off if the truth is known. Not everyone agrees with this. The whole 
point of paternalistic censorship (whether it be censorship of 
pornographic or racist material in the United States or censorship 
of political news in the Soviet Union), is that it is better for society 
in general and often better for individuals themselves if they are not 
exposed to certain sorts of ideas even if there is some truth to those 
ideas. The consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom then 
depends upon first establishing whether or not people are better off 
when they are exposed to all intellectual efforts. The typical result 
is that one starts dividing up intellectual efforts into those that are 
good for people and those that are not. Defending the distribution 
of only the former is not defending intellectual freedom in principle. 
To defend intellectual freedom in principle, and not merely in 
those cases where it can be shown to be of benefit to someone, one 
needs to provide a deontological defense of intellectual freedom. One 
method in providing such a defense involves deriving the right to 
information from the nature of man. Another method involves 
demonstrating that one could not consistently will that information 
be withheld from people. 
It would be inconsistent to will that the truth be withheld from 
people. If the truth were withheld from everyone, then you would 
not have enough evidence to decide what are the truths that are to 
be withheld. Withholding all information, not merely the truth, does 
not lead to this inconsistency. There does, however, seem to be some 
silliness in the suggestion that we might adopt the maxim: Withhold 
all information from everyone. Adopting the maxim: Withhold 
harmful information sounds more like a maxim that a censor might 
wish to act upon. While it cannot be demonstrated that there is any 
inconsistency involved in adopting such a maxim, it should be pointed 
out that it returns us to consequentialist reasoning as we must 
determine what information has harmful consequences. The defender 
of intellectual freedom can reply that one can consistently act upon 
the maxim: Withhold no information. To adopt this maxim is to 
refuse to censor information even when that information is regarded 
as harmful. To adopt this maxim is to say that no one needs to 
justify hidher request for information on any consequentialist 
grounds. Thus this is a “safer” ethical theory for defending 
intellectual freedom than is consequentialism. 
One can obtain similar results if one provides a deontological 
defense of intellectual freedom not based on Kantian criteria for a 
maxim but based on rights derived from the nature of man. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that man’s nature (or essence) is his 
rationality, one may argue that any attempt to limit man’s ability 
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to reason is an attack on man’s very nature, his primary mode of 
survival. Next, one argues that limiting man’s ability to receive 
criticism of his own ideas and/or limiting man’s access to the ideas 
of others would limit man’s ability to reason. The conclusion is that 
limitations on intellectual freedom are attacks on man himself. By 
this reasoning all people have a right to all information regardless 
of whether or not that information might be harmful to them. Again, 
one need not justify any request for information on consequentialist 
grounds. Thus this deontological defense of intellectual freedom is 
also a “safer” defense than consequentialist defenses. 
A “safer” defense is one that admits to fewer exceptions to the 
principle being advocated. To say that deontological defenses of 
intellectual freedom are “safer” is not to say that they are more 
ethically valid. Perhaps, as consequentialist ethics allows, there 
should be limits to intellectual freedom based on consequences. To 
say that deontological defenses of intellectual freedom are “safer” 
is not to say that they admit to no circumstance in which censorship 
is justified. It is possible that the maxim: Withhold no information 
may conflict with another maxim such as those protecting personal 
privacy or private property. As stated earlier, establishing a 
deontological right to information is the beginning, not the end, 
of an ethical investigation concerning intellectual freedom. 
NOTES 
1. The public 	 television series Ethics in  America was produced by Columbia 
University Seminars on Media and Society. Three books are available to those 
who wish to use the series in  teaching ethics: a source reader, a study guide, 
and a preview packet. These have been published in  1989 by Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
2. 	Any ethics textbook will have information on both consequentialist and 
deontological theories. One good source for further reading is Modern Moral 
Philosophy by W.D. Hudson, published by Anchor Books Doubleday and Co. 
Inc., Garden City, NY in 1970. Another good source on ethics (or any other 
philosophical topic) is T h e  Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by Paul Edwards 
and published by Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. and The Free Press, NY, 1967. 
3. 	This topic is discussed at length in the Republic by Plato. In the Nichomachean 
Ethics, Aristorle assumes that it must be to our advantage to be ethical and develops 
an ethical theory consistent with this assumption. More recently the advantage 
of being ethical was a major topic in T h e  Moral Point of View by Kurt Baier 
published by Cornell in  Ithaca, NY in 1958. 
4. 	While many versions of this theory have been developed in  the last thirty years, 
the terminology used here was introduced by R.B. Brandt in  his book Ethical 
Theory published by Prentice Hall, Englewoods Cliffs, NJ in  1959. 
5. 	The term deontology derives from the Greek words deon for duty and logos for 
science. Thus deontic ethics is the science of duty. 
6. This story is told in  A Short History of Ethics by Alasdair MacIntyre published 
in 1966 by Macmillan Publishing Company, NY. 
7. Kant’s theory is developed in  the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of 
Morals written in 1785. There are many English translations. The translation 
by L.W. Beck was published by the Library of Liberal Arts, New York, in 1963. 
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8. 	The natural rights theory that influenced the authors of the U.S. Constitution 
was developed by John Locke in Two Treatises of Government, first published 
in 1690. For an excellent modern discussion of natural rights theories, see William 
Frankena, “Natural and Inalienable Rights.” Philosophical Review, vol. 64, 1955, 
212-232. 
9. The theory of “prima facie duties” was developed by W.D. Ross in Foundations 
of Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939 and T h e  Right  and the Good, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1930 and by H.A. Prichard in papers that were published in the 
collection Moral Obligation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949. 
10. Mill’s discussion of this topic is found at the end of the section titled “Of Thought 
and Discussion” in O n  Liberty which was first published in 1859. This work 
can be found in many collections including, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and 
Representative Government, by John Stuart Mill published by E.P. Dutton and 
Company, NY in 1951. 
